By Michael Peel, Ryan McNeill, and Kylie Kang
Since the outbreak of the war, Iran and its allies in the region have carried out dozens of precision strikes on infrastructure facilities in the Gulf, systematically disrupting critical equipment and causing a cascade of failures and economic damage across the region, in an elaborate campaign that helps explain how the Islamic Republic has managed to withstand the might of the United States military.
Iran and its allied groups, armed by Tehran, targeted vital oil transport systems in Fujairah, UAE—the primary port located outside the Strait of Hormuz—disrupting operations for weeks. They also targeted the Ras Laffan liquefied natural gas (LNG) facility in Qatar, hitting two of the “reliquefaction units” that house the equipment used to liquefy gas.
They also targeted airports in at least four countries, carrying out strikes this month on an airport in Saudi Arabia over four days within a single week. They destroyed a pumping station and damaged two others along a major Saudi pipeline, disrupting another key alternative route to bypass the blockade imposed by Iran on the Strait of Hormuz.
Regional governments and other parties have announced attacks targeting Gulf infrastructure during the war without going into detail. However, an investigation by Reuters reveals the precision of these strikes, the disruption of vital equipment at key facilities, and the scale of the physical and economic damage they caused.
Iran has targeted infrastructure in Arab Gulf states—Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Iraq, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, and Bahrain. The Reuters investigation concluded that the Islamic Republic has launched at least 135 drone and missile attacks on at least 84 infrastructure sites in the Gulf since the U.S. and Israel began a bombing campaign against Iran on February 28.
The attacks spread fear across the Gulf, caused oil prices to surge, and helped Tehran mitigate the impact of months of relentless U.S. military pressure. Alongside the blockade imposed by the Islamic Republic on the Strait of Hormuz, its capability to launch precision strikes poses a persistent threat to its Arab Gulf neighbors, granting it wide influence over the global economy and a strong leverage tool in peace negotiations with the United States.
Some targets are located beneath rooftops and sun-shielding structures, making detection from space impossible. The size of other targets is no more than a few meters, and the purpose of many is not immediately clear to anyone lacking expertise in fields such as oil refining, nuclear technology, or metal smelting.
Without visiting the sites, Reuters could not determine the success rate of Gulf air defenses or the extent of the damage in all cases. However, it repeatedly concluded that the Iranian strikes were characterized by high precision and that the targeted equipment was vital.
Ryan Stephens, a former US Marine Corps special operations air strike coordinator who reviewed the findings of the Reuters investigation, said the Iranian strikes demonstrated “precision, target selection expertise, and patience.”
The United States, which enforces a blockade on Iranian oil, has consistently downplayed Iran’s capacity to inflict destruction. Arab Gulf states also frequently refrain from acknowledging major damage, often attributing damage to their facilities to falling debris from successful interceptions of Iranian munitions.
Captain Tim Hawkins, spokesperson for the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), said, “CENTCOM has been entirely clear in communicating the threats posed by Iran at both regional and global levels.”
The success of Iran’s systematic attack on infrastructure serves as another example of the Islamic Republic’s resilience in the face of international economic sanctions.
Some sites experienced periods of near-daily bombardment and face repair costs and revenue losses estimated in the billions of dollars. Meanwhile, other sites, including one of the world’s largest aluminum smelters in Abu Dhabi, suffered widespread destruction within a single day. Some of these attacks were carried out by the Ansar Allah movement and Iraqi factions.
The port of Fujairah was among the most heavily struck locations. Its location immediately south of the Strait of Hormuz allowed the UAE to bypass the blockade imposed by Iran. The port served as a lifeline for global trade, helping to alleviate the impact of the largest oil supply disruption in decades.
Reuters found that Iranian drones and missiles targeted the port of Fujairah at least 19 times since the outbreak of war on February 28, paralyzing vital parts of its operational activities.
A foreign business owner who witnessed a wave of attacks on Fujairah in mid-March from a nearby road said, “We were watching the attack approach and watching helicopters shoot drones out of the sky.” A Reuters review of attack footage supported his description. He added, “They were launching swarms of drones, and one or two managed to break through the defenses.”
Reuters reporters interviewed 36 people familiar with the infrastructure attacks, gathered photos and video footage of the strikes, and analyzed data, official statements, and radar, optical, and meteorological satellite data to verify evidence of damage and attack timing. The reporters presented their findings to facility operators and governments of the attacked nations.
In at least 34 official statements following the attacks, governments asserted that any damage occurred due to falling debris from successful interception operations. Air defense systems in Gulf states are stationed near some of the most sensitive sites, including U.S.-made Patriot anti-missile systems, which defense intelligence firm Jane’s stated could be observed via satellite about three kilometers north of Fujairah.
In response to detailed questions regarding the Reuters findings, the UAE government stated, “History has proven that instability in the Middle East frequently spills beyond regional borders and has far-reaching consequences… Therefore, renewed efforts toward de-escalation are essential to prevent the situation from sliding into a broader conflict.”
Gulf states are working to limit the circulation of information regarding the scale of losses. In the UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, capturing or sharing certain photos or videos of strike aftermaths is prohibited. These nations also consistently rely on laws banning the dissemination of rumors and misinformation to justify restricting media coverage of the strikes. Reuters and other international media published visually verified evidence of strikes occurring during the war.
Matthew Reed, president of Foreign Reports, a consultancy specializing in oil affairs, said, “Gulf states have come to treat damage assessments as if they were state secrets.” The United States and Israel are also tight-lipped about damage to American bases and Israeli sites, though many details have emerged through government and media reports, including those by Reuters.
The Bahraini government—the sole Gulf state to respond to questions regarding these restrictions—stated that these measures are implemented “to safeguard public safety, ensure the integrity of investigations, and prevent the use of such materials in assessing or planning further attacks.”
Iranian attacks on economic infrastructure in the Gulf paralleled strikes targeting American military assets in the region. The Pentagon’s Inspector General informed Congress that Iran struck hundreds of facilities at U.S. bases, as well as dozens of aircraft.
To estimate the extent of infrastructure damage and pinpoint precisely which targets were hit, Reuters shared its findings and images with 11 insiders in sectors related to the targeted sites, along with Stephens (the former U.S. Marine officer), another former U.S. military member currently working in regional security, and a former U.S. security official with expertise in counterterrorism and satellite image analysis.
All 14 individuals largely ruled out the possibility that the damage to essential equipment across dozens of major infrastructure sites was caused primarily by randomly falling debris. Many cited visual evidence showing explosions rather than merely metal object impacts, and pointed to the operational significance of the targets themselves.
Gulf officials have publicly called for a peace agreement encompassing Iran’s missile and drone programs, fearing they will remain a regional threat for years to come. Reuters previously reported that the Saudi Crown Prince directly requested military support from U.S. President Donald Trump following a series of attacks launched by the Ansar Allah movement in Yemen in early September, but his request was denied.
An attack on September 10 against the Saudi East-West pipeline—another key route bypassing the Strait of Hormuz—halted the flow of crude oil through it, threatening up to four percent of global oil supplies. Saudi Arabia stated that the attack was carried out by armed groups in Iraq receiving weapons and support from Iran. Iranian strikes on Qatar’s Ras Laffan LNG facilities were even more disruptive, threatening nearly 20 percent of global liquefied natural gas flows.
In a March interview with Reuters, Saad Sherida al-Kaabi, CEO of QatarEnergy, estimated that full repair of the primary refrigeration units at the LNG facilities destroyed in two Iranian strikes would take between three and five years.
The Ras Laffan LNG facility is one of at least four infrastructure sites across the Gulf that will require about a year or more to restore full operational capacity. These sites also include the Pearl GTL plant in Qatar, the Habshan gas complex in the UAE, and Emirates Global Aluminium’s Al Taweelah smelter, according to corporate data and an assessment by energy information and analytics firm IIR Energy.
Sultan al-Jaber, CEO of Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC), said in a May interview with the Atlantic Council, “All targeted sites were civilian: airports, harbors, refineries, gas processing facilities, residential areas, shopping malls, and finally the Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant.”
Al-Jaber, who also serves as the UAE Minister of Industry and Advanced Technology, stated, “They are targeting our infrastructure, but what they are truly targeting is our way of life.”
The governments of Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq did not respond to requests for comment, nor did ADNOC.
Carefully Selected Targets
Originally conceived as an economic development project, the port of Fujairah became fully operational in 1983.
That same year, a classified CIA assessment concluded that Iran was likely to respond to perceived threats by launching attacks on energy infrastructure in Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, and the UAE. Declassified in 2019, the assessment found that “even a few attacks against carefully selected targets could cause significant damage to Gulf oil facilities.”
A Reuters analysis showed that Iran targeted the UAE more than any other Gulf state during the first two months of the war, with Fujairah being the country’s most heavily targeted location. Throughout the first three months of the war, the port was either under attack or undergoing repair work.
The first attack on Fujairah was announced on March 3. Two days later, burning tanks could still be seen from the air, and two oil storage companies suspended operations.
The subsequent attack, announced on March 9, extended beyond destroying fuel. Satellite imagery showed the strike disrupted a key distribution system—a network of 62 pipelines transporting crude oil and petroleum products from oil terminals to loading berths.
UAE officials attributed the damage from the first two attacks to falling debris.
Ramanan Krishnamoorthy, a petroleum engineering professor at University of Houston who reviewed the Reuters findings, said it is hard to believe debris simply fell onto the main distribution network. “It’s a bullseye,” he remarked.
Further strikes followed on March 14, 16, and 17, beginning hours after the U.S. launched an attack on military targets at Iran’s Kharg Island oil export terminal. According to a Reuters analysis of satellite imagery, four experts who reviewed the images, and a person familiar with the damage, one of these strikes hit Fujairah’s other main distribution network.
Damage to the second distribution network had not been previously reported. This damage explains why oil loading in Fujairah dropped to 440,000 barrels per day in the week starting March 16—less than half the 2025 daily average, according to export data from analytics firm Kpler.
The war pushed Brent crude futures near or above $120 a barrel during March, April, and May, compared to about $70 a barrel in February. Brent crude settled yesterday at $106 a barrel.
Thomas Warrick, a former deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, said Iran possesses a large number of individuals “who understand the oil industry, people who know how to build and guide missiles.”
Before the war, Iran possessed the Middle East’s largest ballistic missile arsenal, including cluster munitions difficult for air defense systems to intercept, according to the U.S. government. Alongside this, Iran maintained a thriving drone industry, capable before the war of producing about 10,000 drones per month, led by Shahed attack drones.
In at least six government statements since the conflict began on February 28, UAE authorities attributed damage to debris resulting from the interception of Iranian drones or missiles. None of those statements indicated severe damage.
Captain Hawkins, the CENTCOM spokesperson, said, “U.S. forces stood and continue to stand alongside regional partners to counter Iranian threats, intercepting thousands of attack drones and missiles through an integrated defense system that has saved countless lives.”
Repair work continued following the mid-March strikes, with satellite imagery showing cranes at damaged sites. In late March, Fujairah exports hit a weekly record of 3.2 million barrels per day, according to Kpler data, which began tracking port exports in 2013.
However, Iran continued its attacks. An April 6 strike hit a building housing vital equipment directing ADNOC oil flows, according to a Reuters analysis of satellite imagery, confirmed by Warrick and a person familiar with Fujairah facility design.
Iran then targeted Fujairah again with a drone on May 4, destroying a set of pipes leading to the first main distribution network damaged in March. Flames re-ignited along the key alternative route used to transport UAE crude away from the Strait of Hormuz. Crucially, refined petroleum product exports from Fujairah effectively halted for a month; according to Kpler data, only a single vessel departed from the day of the attack through June 1.
Petroleum product exports did not recover until September. The UAE acknowledged the May 4 Iranian drone attack. Iranians also targeted at least one other UAE site: the Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant on May 17.
Iranian Intelligence
U.S. officials believe Iran may have received intelligence from Russia and China. Additionally, an Iranian official and two Gulf regional officials said Tehran relies on informant networks with access to sensitive sites to relay photos and location information.
Responding to Reuters questions regarding intelligence sharing, the Chinese Foreign Ministry stated it “consistently and strictly fulfills its international obligations.” Russia did not respond to a request for comment.
The three officials stated that Iran possessed information including engineering schematics for the Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant and the location of a substation struck within the facility.
The UAE stated that the drone striking the nuclear plant on May 17 was one of three launched by “armed factions in Iraq.” According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the substation strike forced one of four reactors to switch to emergency diesel generators.
In photos captured June 16, among the first clear images obtained by Reuters, damage appeared in two spots on the roof of a building housing plant power line control systems, about 130 meters from one of the reactors.
IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stated the attack showed detailed knowledge of the plant. Speaking during a June 2 visit to the UAE, Grossi added, “This means whoever executed or stood behind this knew precisely what they were doing.”
Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC), which operates the plant, did not contest the damage analysis. The IAEA did not respond to a request for comment.
ENEC stated in a message to Reuters, “The plant’s safety systems and established procedures responded as designed. Nuclear safety was unaffected, there were no injuries or radioactive leaks, radiation levels remained within normal ranges, and there was no risk to the public or environment.”
Impact Across the Region
In Kuwait, as with the UAE, the presence of U.S. military forces and advanced American weaponry was insufficient to prevent attacks.
Iran systematically targeted energy export infrastructure and its airport almost immediately after war broke out. Strikes focused on a sprawling industrial area in Ahmadi Governorate, about 50 kilometers south of Kuwait City, which houses the Mina al-Ahmadi, Mina Abdullah, and Shuaiba refineries, alongside the Shuaiba power and water desalination plant.
The Kuwait Ports Authority suspended operations for 24 hours on the first day of war after debris fell near Shuaiba port. Within three weeks, neighboring Mina al-Ahmadi and Mina Abdullah refineries were also struck.
In April, Kuwait did not export a single barrel of crude oil for the first time since 1991, according to tanker tracking firm TankerTrackers.
By the end of July, Iranian projectiles had damaged at least 13 facilities across the vast Shuaiba industrial zone, according to satellite imagery.
Iranian attacks were not limited to refineries, oilfields, and other energy facilities.
Iranian munitions hit airports in Bahrain and Kuwait, as well as several airports in the UAE and Saudi Arabia in particular. The deadliest attack, attributed to the Ansar Allah movement, killed 12 people at King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh on Saturday.
Kuwait Airport was struck eight times, including an attack occurring just two days after one of its main terminals reopened following repairs from prior damage.
Iran also targeted advanced digital infrastructure, including Amazon data centers in the UAE and Bahrain, where services remained down six months later due to unrepairable damaged equipment. Amazon declined to comment directly on the Reuters investigation, pointing instead to a public statement issued September 15 stating it continues “working to restore regional resources.”
Iran disrupted operations across all 1,262 reduction cells at Emirates Global Aluminium’s Al Taweelah smelter. It took two months before the first cell was restarted. The company reported that by late August, only a quarter of these cells had been restarted, and production is not expected to return to normal levels before 2027, according to the company.
Frank Davis, who spent 42 years in the aluminum industry across nine different smelters worldwide and visited the EGA plant, said the Iranian attack hit the facility’s power plant and one of its three potlines—lines comprising hundreds of pots producing molten aluminum.
Davis reviewed satellite imagery obtained by Reuters, noting that targeting one potline would not have affected the other two, but the strike on the power plant caused total operational shutdown.
EGA did not respond to a request for comment. Global aluminum prices surged 5 percent to a four-year high following attacks on the UAE smelter and another less destructive strike on a Bahrain smelter within days.
Among the most prominent attacks was when Iran targeted electricity and water supplies in Kuwait.
U.S. President Donald Trump was the first to publicly threaten Iranian water supplies in March. However, Michael Christopher Low, director of the Middle East Center at the University of Utah, said Iranians turned that threat into reality for their neighbors.
This threat was most severe for Kuwait, a desert nation deriving 90 percent of its drinking water from desalination plants. These facilities are often linked to coastal power plants because desalination requires massive quantities of thermal and electrical energy.
Reuters found that Iran targeted at least four of Kuwait’s eight dual-purpose power and water desalination plants between March 2 and July 20, with some hit multiple times. During a four-day span in July, Iran attacked what the government described as “several” desalination plants, including one hit at least twice during that brief period.
Low noted Kuwait lacks natural water resources allowing it to forgo desalination plants. He added, “If a large portion of its production capacity is targeted, we are talking about potential water depletion within days or weeks.”
The Kuwaiti government launched a campaign urging citizens to ration electricity and water consumption in a spirit of “shared responsibility.”
Oil and gas exports operate within an interconnected system starting from extraction wells, through hundreds of kilometers of pipelines, refineries, and finally ports loading shipments for global markets.
In Saudi Arabia, the Gulf’s largest oil nation, this network provides an almost inexhaustible array of potential targets—a vulnerability warned against repeatedly over decades, including in the 1983 CIA report. The kingdom produces about 10 percent of global crude oil, along with natural gas and petrochemicals.
Virtually all Saudi oil exports flow through two main ports. Most traffic normally passes through Ras Tanura on the Gulf, but oil can also be exported from the large King Fahd Industrial Port in Yanbu, the Red Sea’s largest port.
When war broke out, Yanbu and the East-West pipeline leading to it became a vital outlet for Saudi oil to bypass the Strait of Hormuz. However, most ships departing the Red Sea port must instead pass areas controlled by Ansar Allah in Yemen and through the narrow Bab el-Mandeb strait.
In March and April, more than a thousand kilometers from the Iranian border, Yanbu was struck by at least two drone attacks, according to two energy industry sources familiar with operations.
Hillary Stevenson, vice president of energy intelligence at IIR Energy, said Iranians targeted the Saudi Aramco Mobil Refinery Company (Samref) in Yanbu with a drone on March 19, reducing production to about 70 percent of capacity until April 9. A satellite image of Yanbu facilities around that time showed burn marks, but Reuters could not determine exactly what was targeted inside the refinery.
Red Sea attacks then subsided as an initial U.S.-Iran ceasefire took effect in early April.
The following day, Trump threatened strikes against Iranian infrastructure. Between July 16 and 18, U.S. forces targeted a tunnel and at least three bridges on main roads leading to Iran’s Bandar Abbas port, headquarters of the Iranian Navy on the Strait of Hormuz, according to a Reuters visual analysis.
Saudi Red Sea oil operations faced intensive targeting.
Reuters found that Jazan refinery, located less than 100 kilometers from the Yemeni border, was targeted at least four times between July 25 and September 7. Stevenson from IIR Energy stated the first attack damaged the refinery tank farm and the adjacent integrated gasification combined cycle complex, which converts oil into gas used to power the refinery.
Refining volumes in Jazan dropped to zero following the attacks, according to Stevenson and two people familiar with Aramco operations. Kpler noted only a single tanker loaded from the refinery since July 24.
Reuters found that since the war began, attacks have damaged five of Saudi Arabia’s nine largest oil refineries and three of its primary oil processing centers, including a facility Aramco describes as the largest of its kind in the world.
Saudi Arabia’s average daily oil production dropped below seven million barrels during most of the first six months of the war, compared to over ten million previously—representing losses exceeding $50 billion at current prices.
Major Western energy companies, including ExxonMobil and Shell, also operate joint venture facilities and reported tens of millions of dollars in total losses from attacks. Aramco, ExxonMobil, and Shell did not respond to requests for comment.
On September 7, the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament explicitly stated the objective of these attacks.
In a post on X following tit-for-tat ship attacks between the U.S. and Iran, Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf wrote, “It’s simple: the oil and gas production chain here is sprawling, accessible, and exposed… American oil and gas companies operating across these waters and in these facilities face the exact same exposure to risk.”
Three days later, an airstrike targeted three pump stations in the Saudi desert, turning one into a charred skeleton and halting crude oil flow via the East-West pipeline to Yanbu. Oil prices once again climbed past $100 a barrel, closing another alternative route around the Strait of Hormuz.
Source: Reuters